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Over the past two decades, Washington and New Delhi have built one of the most fruitful post–Cold War strategic partnerships. But now, after years of diplomatic and defense collaboration, that relationship has hit one of its lowest points, with trust between the two countries evaporating over tariffs, oil politics, and realignment of the global order.

In an interview with TIME, South Asia expert Evan Feigenbaum of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was blunt. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled. The trust is gone,” he said.

Trump put sweeping tariffs on Indian imports earlier this year after India continued to purchase Russian oil despite its war in Ukraine. The tariff, which started at 25 percent, will increase to 50 percent on Aug. 27. Instead of pressuring India to change its purchasing patterns, the decision seems to have only brought the country closer to Moscow and even Beijing.

India’s national security adviser visited Moscow last month, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held high-level meetings there, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up talks in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is planning his first visit to China in over seven years and is also expected to see Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow before the end of the year. Analysts say that this eastward shift is more than posturing.

Indian public sentiment has also soured over what some see as U.S. meddling. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

India’s state-run refiners briefly halted Russian oil imports in the early days of the war but had returned to purchasing it after discounts of 6% to 7% became available. As a result, Russian oil has come to make up 35% of India’s crude imports, from just 0.2% before the Ukraine war. Russia has looked to capitalize, with Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov saying Moscow would continue to ship crude, oil products, thermal coal, coking coal, and saw “potential for the export of Russian LNG.”

Trump’s Tariffs and Modi’s Diversion

India’s pivot to Russia and China pre-dates Trump’s tariffs, but the President’s actions have served as a catalyst. Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst based in Washington, said the sanctions “have not been the primary factor in India’s recent overtures to Russia. We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly.”

Kugelman added that some of New Delhi’s moves are performative, while others are more long-lasting. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative,” Feigenbaum said.

India had been buying fewer Russian arms in the years leading up to the Ukraine war and filling those gaps with U.S., French, and Israeli equipment. But once the war started, trade in energy with Moscow spiked. Kugelman said this was a signal to India that “the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

For Modi, there is domestic political value at stake in signaling to voters that he is protecting India’s sovereignty, especially by helping to maintain the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, and young workers. Kugelman noted that India had already given ground to the U.S. on tariff cuts, as well as repatriation of Indian workers during the pandemic. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

Anger has been brewing in Washington. White House trade adviser Peter Navarro wrote an op-ed in the Financial Times calling India’s purchases “opportunistic” and “deeply corrosive.” He said the tariffs were necessary to hit India “where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

Nuclear Tests and Trust Issues

The erosion of trust marks a major change from earlier touchstones of the relationship, like the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. The deal broke with past American non-proliferation efforts by providing India with U.S. fuel and technology even though it is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But at the time, both countries found a way to compartmentalize the dispute so that it would not damage the cooperation.

This time around, with the United States already eyeing India as the bulwark of democratic resilience against China in the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, things look much different. Tensions in the U.S.–India relationship have spilled over from trade and commerce into other areas of defense and intelligence cooperation.

“Countering China has been the glue binding this relationship,” Kugelman said. “But if the U.S.–India relationship continues this free fall, it will be very difficult to sustain.”

Feigenbaum noted that the circumstances of the current moment were almost the inverse of the past. “Then, India was leveraging its partnership to signal to then-foe China that it had options. Now they’re working with the Chinese to signal Washington rather than the other way around,” he said.

The Bottom Line

The message coming out of Delhi is that India will be free to choose who it wants to get close to, even if it means courting America’s rivals.